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updated Signed Directory Operations Draft <draft-ietf-ldapext-sig ops-02.txt>
Below is an update to the signed directory operations draft. Many thanks to
Phil Griffin for making me fix the ASN.1, which is now collected in the
notes section (i.e. section 3).
Bruce
LDAP Extensions Working Group Bruce Greenblatt
Internet Draft Pat Richard
<draft-ietf-ldapext-sigops-02.txt>
Expires in six months
Signed Directory Operations Using S/MIME
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and
its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working
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ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).
Distribution of this document is unlimited.
Abstract
This document defines an LDAP v3 based mechanism for signing direc-
tory operations in order to create a secure journal of changes that have
been made to each directory entry. Both client and server based signa-
tures are supported. An object class for subsequent retrieval are
"journal entries" is also defined. This document specifies LDAP v3 con-
trols that enable this functionality. It also defines an LDAP v3 schema
that allows for subsequent browsing of the journal information.
Greenblatt and Richard [Page 1]
Internet Draft May 1998
1. Audit Trail Mechanism
Signed directory operations is a straightforward application of
S/MIME technology that also leverages the extensible framework that is
provided by LDAP version 3. LDAP version 3 is defined in [4], and
S/MIME is defined in [2]. The security used in S/MIME is based in the
definitions in [1]. The basic idea is that the submitter of an LDAP
operation that changes the directory information includes an LDAP ver-
sion 3 control that includes either a signature of the operation, or a
request that the LDAP server sign the operation on the behalf of the
LDAP client. The result of the operation (in addition to the change of
the directory information), is additional information that is attached
to directory objects, that includes the audit trail of signed opera-
tions. The LDAP control is (OID = 1.2.840.113549.6.0.0):
SignedOperation ::= CHOICE {
signbyServer [0] BOOLEAN,
signatureIncluded [1] OCTET STRING
}
If the SignatureIncluded CHOICE is used, then the OCTET string is
just an S/MIME message of the multipart/signed variety, that is composed
of a single piece, that is the signature of the directory operation.
Multipart/signed MIME objects are defined in [3]. If the SignbyServer
CHOICE us used, then the LDAP server creates the signature on behalf of
the client, using its own identity and not the identity of the client,
in order to produce the audit trail entry. In either case the success-
ful result of processing the control is the creation of additional
information in the directory entry that is being modified or created.
The signature of the LDAP operation is computed on the LDAPMessage prior
to the inclusion of the SignedOperation control. The procedure is as
follows:
- Build LDAPMessage without the SignedOperation control
- Compute signature on the above LDAPMessage
- Create new LDAPMessage that includes the old MessageID, protocolOp
and any
control fields from the previous LDAPMessage, plus the computed
signature
formatted as an S/MIME message.
No control is defined for the server to return in the LDAPResult as
defined in [4]. The LDAP server MAY attempt to parse and verify the
signature included in the SignedOperation control, but is not required
to. The server can accept the signed operation without verifying the
signature. Signature verification can be quite a lengthy operation,
requiring complex certificate chain traversals. This allows a more
timely creation of the audit trail by the server. Any LDAP client
Greenblatt and Richard [Page 2]
Internet Draft May 1998
browsing the directory that retrieves the 'Changes' (defined in the fol-
lowing paragraphs) attributes, should verify the signature of each value
according to the local signature verification policies. Even if the
LDAP server verifies the signature contained in the singed operation,
the LDAP client has no way of knowing what policies were followed by the
server in order to verify the signature.
If the LDAP server is unable to verify the signature and wishes to
return an error then the error code unwillingToPerform(53) should be
returned, and the entire LDAP operation fails. In this situation, an
appropriate message (e.g. "Unable to verify signature") MAY be included
in the errorMessage of the LDAPResult. The SignedOperation Control MAY
be marked CRITICAL, and if it is CRITICAL then if the LDAP Server per-
forms the LDAP operation, then must include the signature in the
signedAuditTrail information.
The schema definition for the signedAuditTrail information is:
( 1.2.840.113549.6.1.0
NAME 'signedAuditTrail'
SUP top
AUXILIARY
MUST (
Changes
)
)
The format of the Changes attribute is:
( 1.2.840.113549.6.2.0
NAME 'Changes'
DESC 'a set of changes applied to an entry'
SYNTAX 'Binary' )
The actual format of the Changes attribute is:
Changes ::= SEQUENCE {
sequenceNumber [0] INTEGER (0 .. maxInt),
signedOperation [1] OCTET STRING }
The SignedOperation attribute is a multipart/signed S/MIME mes-
sage. Part 1 of the message is the directory operation, and part 2 is
the signature. Sequence number 0 (if present) always indicates the
starting point directory object as represented by the definitions in "A
MIME Content-Type for Directory Information", as defined in [5].
Greenblatt and Richard [Page 3]
Internet Draft May 1998
Subsequent sequence numbers indicate the sequence of changes that have
been made to this directory object. Note that the sequence of the
changes can be verified due to the fact that the signed directory object
will have a timestamp as part of the signature object, and that the
sequence numbering as part of the change attribute should be considered
to be an unverified aid to the LDAP client. Sequence numbers are mean-
ingful only within the context of a single directory entry, and LDAP
servers are not expected to maintain these sequence numbers across all
entries in the directory.
Some LDAP servers will only allow operations that include the
SignedOperation control. This is indicated by the inclusion of a
'signedDirectoryOperationSupport' attribute in the rootDSE. This
attribute is defined as:
( 1.2.840.113549.6.2.2
NAME 'signedDirectoryOperationSupport'
DESC 'how many of the LDAP operations must be signed'
SYNTAX 'Integer' SINGLE-VALUE )
The 'signedDirectoryOperationSupport' attribute above may have one
of the values, '0', '1' or '2' with the following meanings:
- '0' Directory Operations may be signed
- '1' Directory Operations must always be signed
- '2' Directory Operations must never be signed
Some LDAP servers will desire that the audit trail be continuous,
and not contain any gaps that would result from unsigned operations.
Such server will include a signature on each LDAP operation that changes
a directory entry, even when the LDAP client does not include a signed-
Operation control.
1.1. Handling the Delete Operation
The LDAP Delete operation represents an interesting case for Signed
Directory Operations. This is due to the case that subsequent to the
successful completion of the Delete Operation, the object that would
have held the latest 'Changes' attribute no longer exists. In order to
handle this situation, a new object class is defined to represent a
directory object that has been deleted.
Greenblatt and Richard [Page 4]
Internet Draft May 1998
( 1.2.840.113549.6.1.2
NAME 'zombieObject'
SUP top
STRUCTURAL
MUST (
Cn $ Changes $ OriginalObject
)
)
The format of the OriginalObject attribute is:
( 1.2.840.113549.6.2.1
NAME OriginalObject
DESC 'The LDAP URL of an object that has been deleted from the
directory'
SYNTAX 'Binary' )
The OriginalObject attribute contains the URL of the object that
was deleted from the directory. It is formatted in accordance with RFC
2255. Directory servers that comply with this specification SHOULD cre-
ate a zombieObject when performing the delete Operation that contains a
SignedOperation LDAPControl. The Cn attribute of the zombieObject is
synthesized by the LDAP server, and may or may not be related to the
original name of the directory entry that was deleted. All changes
attributes that were attached to the original entry are copied over to
the zombieObject. In addition the LDAP Server MUST attach the signature
of the Delete operation as the last successful change that was made to
the entry.
2. Signed Results Mechanism
A control is also defined that allows the LDAP v3 client to request
that the server sign the results that it returns. It is intended that
this control is primarily used in concert with the LDAPSearch operation.
This control MAY be marked as CRITICAL. If it is marked as CRITICAL and
the LDAP Server supports this operation, then all search results MUST be
returned with a signature as attached in the SignedResult control if it
is willing to sign results for this user. If the server supports this
control but does not wish to sign the results for this user then the
error code unwillingToPerform(53) should be returned, and the LDAP
search will have failed. In this situation, an appropriate message
(e.g. "Unwilling to sign results for you!") MUST be included in the
errorMessage of the LDAPResult. If the LDAPSigType has the value FALSE
then the client is requesting that the server not sign this operation.
This may be done in situations where servers are configured to always
sign their operations.
Greenblatt and Richard [Page 5]
Internet Draft May 1998
The LDAP control to include in the LDAP request is (OID =
1.2.840.113549.6.0.1):
DemandSignedResult ::= LDAPSigType
LDAPSigType ::= BOOLEAN
In response to a DemandSignedResult control, the LDAP v3 server
will return a SignedResult control in addition to the normal result as
defined by the operation (assuming that the server understands the con-
trol, and is willing to perform it). The SignedResult control MUST NOT
be marked CRITICAL. Some LDAP v3 servers may be configured to sign all
of their operations. In this situation the server always returns a
SignedResult control, unless instructed otherwise by the DemandSigne-
dResult Control. Since the SignedResult control is not marked critical,
the LDAP client is allowed to ignore it. The signature field below
includes the signature of the enitre LDAPResult formatted as an S/MIME
pkcs-7/signature object, as defined in [2]. The procedure for creating
the signature of the signedResult control is the same as the procedure
for the creation of the signedOperation control. The LDAP control in
the LDAP response is (OID = 1.2.840.113549.6.0.2):
SignedResult ::= CHOICE {
signature OCTET STRING }
Do there need to be other kinds of signed results???
3. Notes
The base OIDs are:
rsadsiLdap ::= {1 2 840 113549 6}
rsadsiLdapControls ::= {1 2 840 113549 6 0}
rsadsiLdapObjectClasses ::= {1 2 840 113549 6 1}
rsadsiLdapAttributes ::= {1 2 840 113549 6 2}
The complete ASN.1 module for this specification is:
Greenblatt and Richard [Page 6]
Internet Draft May 1998
SIGNEDOPERATIONS DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN
SignedOperation ::= CHOICE {
signbyServer [0] BOOLEAN,
signatureIncluded [1] OCTET STRING
}
Changes ::= SEQUENCE {
sequenceNumber [0] INTEGER (0 .. maxInt),
signedOperation [1] OCTET STRING }
DemandSignedResult ::= LDAPSigType
LDAPSigType ::= BOOLEAN
SignedResult ::= CHOICE {
signature OCTET STRING }
END
If any of the controls in this specification are supported by an
LDAP v3 server then that server MUST make available its certificate (if
any) in the userCertificate attribute of its rootDSE object. The
UserCertificate attribute is defined in [6], and contains the public key
of the server that is used in the creation of the various signatures
defined in this specification.
It is not the intention of this specification to provide a mecha-
nism that guarantees the origin and integrity of LDAP v3 operations.
Such a service is best provided by the use of an underlying protocol
such as TLS [8]. TLS defines additional features such as encryption and
compression. This specification does not define support for encrypted
operations.
4. References
[1] RFC 2315 PKCS 7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1-5. B.
Kaliski. March 1998.
[2] RFC 2311 S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification. S. Dusse, P.
Hoffman, B. Ramsdell, L. Lundblade, L. Repka. March 1998.
[3] RFC 1847 Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and
Multipart/Encrypted. J. Galvin, S. Murphy, S. Crocker & N. Freed. Octo-
ber 1995.
Greenblatt and Richard [Page 7]
Internet Draft May 1998
[4] RFC 2251 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3). M. Wahl,
T. Howes, S. Kille. December 1997.
[5] Internet Draft, work in progress, "A MIME Content-Type for
Directory Information", Tim Howes, Mark Smith, Frank Dawson Jr.,
04/22/1998.
[6] RFC 2256 A Summary of the X.500(96) User Schema for use with
LDAPv3. M. Wahl. December 1997.
[7] RFC 2255 The LDAP URL Format. T. Howes, M. Smith. December
1997.
[8] Internet Draft, work in progress, "The TLS Protocol Version
1.0", Tim Dierks, Chris Allen., 11/12/1997.
5. Author's Address
Bruce Greenblatt
RSA Data Security
2955 Campus Drive, Suite 400
San Mateo, CA 94403
USA
Email: bgreenblatt@rsa.com
Phone: +1-650-295-7569
Pat Richard
Xcert Software, Inc.
Suite 1001 - 701 W. Georgia
Vancouver, BC
CANADA V6G 1C9
Email: patr@xcert.com
Greenblatt and Richard [Page 8]
Internet Draft May 1998
Table of Contents
1. Audit Trail Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Handling the Delete Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Signed Results Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Greenblatt and Richard [Page 9]